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A NOVEL APPROACH TO MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS:  THE 
BILLION DOLLAR SETTLEMENT IN THE SULZER ARTIFICIAL 
HIP AND KNEE LITIGATION:  A SYMPOSIUM 
 
PROFESSOR LANDEVER:  Welcome.  My name is Professor Arthur 
Landever and along with Professor Susan Becker I would like to welcome you to this 
symposium.  I know you’ll find it worthwhile.  I would like to call on Dean 
Steinglass for some introductory remarks.  
DEAN STEINGLASS:  Hold the applause until I’m done.   
Let me just welcome everyone here.  I know many of the people in the room are 
students, and we always welcome you here.  And I’m also very pleased to see so 
many people wearing coats and ties and business suits, so I assume this program has 
reached out to the legal community as well, and that’s as it should be.  This law 
school really is very much a part of this legal community.   
And when we do events like this, we are delighted at people who take a short 
walk or bus and come visit us.  They can’t come by car, of course, because parking is 
always at a premium, but we do welcome you here.  
My only role is to talk while the tech guys get things set up, but I do want to 
welcome everyone here.  As I say, as a recovering civil procedure teacher, I’m quite 
interested in finding out what is going to be said.   
I do want to extend a very special thanks to Judge O’Malley and Eric Kennedy, 
to Sidney Backstrom appearing in person in case Mr. Scruggs says something wrong 
or doesn’t come in on the screen, Judge McMonagle, and my colleague and former 
student, Susan Becker.  All the good things she does, she did on her own.  The bad 
things are things she learned in civil procedure from me.  And she’s done a great job.  
Of course, I want to thank you, Arthur Landever, for putting this together.   
Have a good conference.  
MS. BECKER:  It is indeed an honor to be here today with Judge O’Malley and 
this esteemed panel of attorneys to discuss class actions. 
As you know our primary focus today is on the Sulzer knee and hip replacement 
class action.  My remarks are intended to place this fascinating and innovative case 
in the larger context of the many issues that we all face as participants in our modern 
civil justice system. 
I am going to do this by briefly refreshing your recollection as to the procedural 
requirements for modern class actions, describing the ongoing controversy 
surrounding use of these procedures, and touching on reform efforts currently 
underway.  I will then provide a short introduction to the Sulzer litigation and 
introduce each panelist. 
1. Class Action Requirements 
Modern class action involve a few plaintiffs – known as the “representative 
parties” stepping forward and filing suit on behalf of others who are similarly 
situated – that is, other persons who have allegedly be harmed through the action of a 
particular defendant or defendants.  
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In federal courts, and many state courts as well, the prerequisites for pursing a 
case as a class action are spelled out in Rule 23.1  This rule is intended to be 
transsubstantive, meaning that it applies regardless of whether the plaintiffs’ claims 
are based in tort, contract, civil rights, or other theory of recovery. 
Rule 23(a) lists four requirements, all of which must be met, with the burden on 
the parties seeking class certification.  These are: 
• numerosity – the class is so large that individual joinder of all members 
is not practicable; 
• common questions – existence of questions of law OR fact common to 
everyone in the class; 
• typicality – a showing that the claims or defenses of a representative 
parties are typical of the class; and 
• adequacy – a showing that the representative parties will adequately 
represent the class interests. 
In addition to satisfying all of those elements, the proposed class action has to 
meet at least one of the three criteria, or types, of class actions spelled out in 23(b) – 
the most common being a 23(b)(3) class action.  It provides that a “class action is 
appropriate if the court finds there are questions of law or fact common to the class 
that predominate over individual member’s unique situations, and that a class action 
is a superior means to achieve a fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” 
Rule 23 also allows a judge to certify subclasses based on specific issues of law 
or fact, and Judge O’Malley did exactly that in the Sulzer case. Judge O’Malley’s 
Memorandum and Order in the Sulzer case that explains how this case meets all the 
Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) criteria is included in the CLE packet handed out today.2  
Rule 23 has a number of additional requirements that place specific 
responsibilities on the judge, the parties, and their respective counsel to make sure 
that the decision on class certification is made expediently and that proper notice is 
provided to class members who will later be bound by the decision.  And, of course, 
one of the most important requirements is class actions cannot, according to the 
rules, be dismissed or compromised without the court’s approval.  
2. Controversy Surrounding Class Actions  
The intent of the class action device is to provide fair and efficient remedies to 
large number of persons harmed though the wrongful act of a defendant.  Class 
actions increasingly have come under fire for not meeting these intended objectives.   
Critics argue that the process has become increasingly complex and burdensome 
for would-be class members. Some also claim that class actions have evolved into a 
procedure that optimizes revenues for plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers, limits liability 
and accountability of defendants, and entices judges to certify questionable class 
actions as a means of managing otherwise unwieldy dockets.   
In short, critics contend, modern class actions all too frequently benefit everyone 
in the litigation process except the class members whom class actions were designed 
to protect.  They frequently support their criticism by citing class actions that result 
                                                                
1FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
2See Appendix 4. 
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in a “fistful of coupons” for class members and substantial cash awards to the 
attorneys.  
Defenders of modern class actions counter that this device has been used fairly 
and efficiently in a wide variety of cases, and has proven especially helpful to people 
who would otherwise lack the resources to pursue individual lawsuits.  Proponents 
claim that class actions help level the playing field in the classic David and Goliath 
battles common to modern litigation.   
In addition to benefiting individual claimants, proponents argue, class actions 
serve the common good by alerting putative class members and the public to 
injustices and injuries of which they might not have been aware and by developing 
creative, comprehensive settlements that preserve continued economic viability of 
defendants.   
These ongoing debates over class actions have filled volumes of legal periodicals 
and resulted in significant reform activities at the state and federal levels.  And keep 
in mind that proposals to change class action practices are part of much larger efforts 
to reform many aspects of our civil justice system – not just as to procedure but in 
terms of tort law reforms as well.  
As to class actions specifically, Federal Rule Civil Procedure 23 and its state 
counterparts have been intensely scrutinized over the past decade, but until recently, 
changes in the actual text of these rules governing class actions have been relatively 
minimal.  Congress has enacted extensive legislation in 1995 and 1997 reforming 
class actions based on claims of federal securities law violations, but to date, has 
resisted additional efforts to “federalize” class actions in other controversial areas 
such as mass tort and products liability.  It now appears that extensive changes to 
class action procedures are just around the corner.   
3. Proposed Reforms 
In March of this year the U.S. Supreme Court approved substantial changes to 
Rule 23 and, pursuant to standard federal rule making procedures, forwarded them 
on to Congress.  These changes are explained in detail in the CLE program materials 
and I won’t belabor them here.  But it is clear from even a cursory reading that these 
amendments are intended to address the recurring criticisms of class action practice 
by requiring heightened judicial scrutiny of proposed class actions and additional 
safeguards for ensuring the fairness of the settlement to all class members.      
The changes have been forwarded to Congress for its approval.  The way the 
process works is that if Congress does NOT take action on such recommendations, 
and they changes become law on December 1 of this year.   
However, Congress has the power to reject or modify the provisions. And that is 
a possibility in this case.  Legislation is pending in both the House and the Senate 
that would substantially change class action practice.  
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2003 (H.R. 1115) for example would greatly 
extend federal court jurisdiction over class actions that previously could only have 
been litigated in state courts.3  The legislation would also require requirement “plain 
English” notices to class members and increased scrutiny by courts regarding 
settlements, especially those involving “coupons” or other non-cash awards to class 
members. 
                                                                
3H.R. 1115 108th Cong. (2003). 
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So it is unclear at this juncture what type of class action reforms will emerge 
from Congress – or what its actual impact will be on class action practice. 
4. The Sulzer Litigation 
Even if these proposed reforms come to fruition, debate over class actions will no 
doubt continue for many years.  Obviously we cannot resolve all these issues in the 
context of this two-hour symposium.  Today we reflect upon some of these recurring 
issues – not just related to class actions but also in the area of mass tort claims–in the 
context of the somewhat unique approach taken in the Sulzer Hip Prosthesis and 
Knee Prosthesis Liability Litigation, which as you know, culminated in a $1 billion 
dollar settlement last spring in the U.S. District Court for the N.D. Ohio. 
I emphasize here that we are focusing upon the Sulzer case NOT because it 
demonstrates the need for reforms; rather, it appears to us unique and creative 
approach to resolving a mass tort class action. 
Defendants are Sulzer AG, a Switzerland based precision manufacturing 
conglomerate; Sulzer Medica AG, and Sulzer’s U.S. subsidiary, Sulzer Orthopedics 
Inc., based in Austin, Texas.  Plaintiffs are individuals who received either an 
artificial hip or knee joint manufactured by Sulzer.  Patients who received these 
implants experienced serious difficulties with them, necessitating some to have 
replacement surgery.  By August 2001, for example, more than 2,400 people had 
undergone operations to replace the defective hip or knee implants and it appeared 
that perhaps as many as 4,000 total replacements surgeries would ultimately be 
performed.  
Also in August 2001, a $15 million judgment was entered against Sulzer on 
behalf of three Corpus Christi women who prevailed in a Texas state court. Sulzer 
aggressively sought class action treatment of the claims stemming from its defective 
joints.  In a novel move,  Sulzer agreed to open its books to an independent review 
firm to determine how much the firm could pay without going bankrupt.  The 
number was $1 billion.   
As negotiated by the parties and approved by the court, the final settlement 
provides compensation for each member of the class based on a variety of factors, 
such as whether the member has undergone – or is likely to undergo – a revision to 
replace the defective part.  The details of the settlement are included in the “Class 
Member and Attorney Guide” included at the end of your CLE program materials.4  I 
will end my remarks here for fear of stealing the thunder of any of our panelists. 
5. Introduction of Panelists 
Each of our panelists possesses an outstanding resume.  In the interest of time, I 
am only going to introduce them briefly in the order in which they will speak. 
R. Eric Kennedy served as lead plaintiffs’ counsel in the Sulzer case.  Mr. 
Kennedy is the managing partner of Weisman, Goldberg & Weisman, L.P.A. and his 
areas of expertise include medical malpractice, product liability, and class actions.  
He sat on the National Settlement Committee of the Breast Implant litigation and 
served as class counsel in the $4.8 billion diet drug settlement.   
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The Honorable Kathleen McDonald O'Malley of the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Ohio presided over the Sulzer class action litigation and 
settlement.  Upon completing a judicial clerkship with Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones 
of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, she entered private practice, where she focused 
on complex corporate and commercial litigation.  She subsequently worked for the 
Ohio Attorney General, providing oversight of the office's 350 attorneys and acting 
as Counsel of Record in the state's more sensitive and complex legal battles.  
President William J. Clinton appointed Judge O'Malley to the federal bench in 1994.   
Sidney A. Backstrom of The Scruggs Law Firm in Pascagoula, Mississippi 
played a key role in the Scruggs Firm’s representation of Defendant Sulzer.  Mr. 
Backstrom’s legal career has focused primarily in plaintiffs work, and he has served 
as member of the Mississippi Trial Lawyers’ Association Board of Governors and is 
currently the section head of the same organizations’ Premise Liability Practice 
Group.  Mr. Backstrom has served with Mr. Scruggs as lead plaintiffs’ counsel in a 
number of class action cases. 
Richard F. Scruggs, who is sharing his insights with us via videotape today, 
served as lead defense counsel for Sulzer.  This was a somewhat unusual role for Mr. 
Scruggs, as he–along with Mr. Backstrom–frequently works as counsel for plaintiffs.  
Since 1994, for example, Mr. Scruggs’ firm has been lead private counsel to the 
Attorney General of Mississippi in that State’s litigation seeking reimbursement 
from the tobacco industry for public health costs associated with smoking.  He also 
played an integral role as part of the litigation teams in similar cases pursued by New 
York, Michigan, Oklahoma, Oregon, Ohio and numerous other states.  Much of this 
litigation resolved favorably for the plaintiff states as reflected in the Master 
Settlement Agreement of 1998.   
James J. McMonagle is serving as the Claims Administrator overseeing 
distribution of the Sulzer class action settlement funds. Mr. McMonagle is currently 
of counsel with Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease, L.L.P., practicing corporate law.  
He also serves as a trustee for the Eagle-Picher Industries Inc. Personal Injury 
Settlement Trust and had served as a trustee and vice chairman for the UNR 
Asbestos Disease Claim Trust.  Mr. McMonagle was elected to the Cuyahoga 
Common Pleas Bench for three consecutive terms (1976, 1982, and 1988) and 
presided by designation in a number of other Ohio common pleas and appeals courts 
Our first speaker today is Eric Kennedy. 
MR. KENNEDY:  Thank you very much.  Free CLEs, I suppose, and requiring 
some civil procedure class tends to do a great thing to bring out the crowd.  It’s a 
little bit like the trial lawyer who halfway through closing arguments begins to 
believe that the jury is actually interested in what he has to say, forgetting that at the 
door there are Federal Marshals making sure the jury doesn’t leave.  I’m going to 
start out and kind of go through the Sulzer story and then involve Judge O’Malley 
and Sid Backstrom.  And I’m going to be followed by Jim McMonagle, who is going 
to talk about the claims administration process.   
I suppose, starting at the beginning you start with Sulzer, the corporation.  Sulzer 
was and is Sulzer Orthopedics, a Texas-based manufacturing company.  Their parent 
is Sulzer Medica, which is a Swiss company which is publicly traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange.  And the grandparent is Sulzer AG.   
Sulzer Orthopedics manufactures orthopedic devices.  One of the products they 
manufactured was a total hip replacement system utilized in hip replacement surgery. 
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Hip replacement surgery involves the femur, that being the bone that runs from 
the knee to the hip.  In hip replacement surgery, the top half of the femur is cut off 
and is replaced by a rod with a steel ball on the end of it.  That steel ball then fits into 
the hip socket, or acetabula.   
The problem is, if you put that steel ball into the hip socket and let it move 
around with the hip, it will ultimately wear away the bone on the inside of the hip 
socket.  So what manufacturers created, all manufacturers, was a shell.   
They created a steel shell that fits inside of the acetabular socket.  And then that 
steel ball fits inside the shell and then can move around without destroying the bone 
inside of the acetabula.   
Now, many manufactures created a shell whereby the shell is screwed into the 
hip socket.  Some created a shell whereby it’s cemented into the socket.   
Sulzer created their shell, as you can see, with a porous coating on the exterior of 
the shell.  It’s a mesh, roughened surface.  The purpose of that roughened surface 
was so that bone would grow into in the surface and, therefore, hold the shell tightly 
into the acetabular hip socket.   
If the bone doesn’t grow into the exterior of the shell, then the shell remains 
loose, the patient remains in pain, and they ultimately will need a hip revision 
surgery to take the shell out and put a new device in. 
In the fall of the year 2000, Sulzer began to get calls from orthopedic surgeons 
around the country reporting to them that the bone wasn’t growing into the shell, the 
patients were staying in pain, and that they were having to do hip replacement 
surgeries. 
Well, these calls continued to come in at an increasing rate throughout the fall of 
2000, until we got to December 8th, 2000, when Sulzer issued a recall of all of their 
total hip shells in the country.  In fact, worldwide.  The problem was that by 
December 8 of 2000, orthopedic surgeons had already implanted 26,000 shells into 
patients in the United States. 
At this point we see the entrance of the Plaintiffs’ Mass Tort Bar.  The Plaintiffs’ 
Mass Tort Bar, interestingly enough, is made up of no more than 15 to 20 lawyers 
throughout the U.S.  And they basically have been involved in every mass tort dating 
back to Agent Orange, Bendectin, leading into breast implant, Telectronics,5 
Propulsid, Rezulin, tobacco, asbestos.  
It’s a group of 15 to 20 lawyers that have worked together in these cases, have 
worked against each other in these cases.  Lawyers that like each other, lawyers that 
dislike each other.  Good lawyers and not so good lawyers.  But lawyers that are all 
well-funded.   
Collectively, the Plaintiffs Mass Tort Bar can go toe-to-toe with any major 
corporation; for that matter, any major industry in the world.  They are not going to 
be outspent in a mass tort. 
So on December 8, 2000, with the cry of a recall, this sleeping bear, the 
Plaintiffs’ Mass Tort Bar, was once again awakened.  Not dissimilar, frankly, to the 
call of road trip by John Belushi in “Animal House.”6  It creates an instant frenzy of 
activity.   
                                                                
5In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 222 F.3d 870 (6th Cir. 2000). 
6NATIONAL LAMPOON’S ANIMAL HOUSE (Universal Studios 1978). 
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Within sixty days there were a dozen law firms advertising these cases around the 
country.  In that sixty days a New York-based law firm had launched a $3 million 
advertising campaign.  Websites sprung up every week.  Sophisticated websites, with 
streaming video, photographs, copies of letters that had been sent to the orthopedic 
surgeons.  A client or an individual recipient of an implant could sign up to become a 
law firm’s client online.  If you typed in “Sulzer” or “recall” or “defective implant, 
hip,” you went to a legal website.  Every major search engine sent you to a legal 
website. 
Sulzer had their own website, but you couldn’t get near it on the web.  The 
patients were being educated by the law firms and not the orthopedic surgeons, and 
certainly not the company that had manufactured the product. 
Within sixty days there were one hundred lawsuits filed.  By the spring of 2001, 
less than five months later, there were one thousand lawsuits that had been filed in 
the country. 
As the lawsuits were coming in on one line of Sulzer, on the other line the phone 
was ringing and it was the orthopedic surgeons again.  And they were telling Sulzer 
they were now having the same problem with the Sulzer’s prosthetic knee device.   
By May 15, Sulzer issued a modified recall with respect to their prosthetic knee 
device, the tibial baseplate.  So in May of 2001, there sat David Wise, the General 
Counsel for Sulzer, and he knew that he already had a thousand lawsuits filed against 
his company.  He knew there was a thousand more hip lawsuits coming.  He knew 
that the knee litigation had just begun.   
He already knew that his liabilities exceeded his assets and insurance coverage.  
He knew, also, that given the Amchem7 and Ortiz8 Supreme Court decisions and the 
Sixth Circuit decision in Telectronics, he probably did not have available to him a 
23(b)(1)(b) non-opt-out limited fund class action, where a court determines that a 
company’s liabilities exceed their assets and the company can then formulate a class 
action whereby the recipients of the product have no choice, they must participate.  
They must participate. 
He knew then that under these circumstances, historically, no company avoided 
bankruptcy.  And the ironic part about it was that he was general counsel for a 
company that had, essentially, no debt.  And despite these two recalls, their sales 
were still strong. 
What David Wise, General Counsel, needed at that point was to understand the 
mentality and the thought process of the bear which he had woken up on two 
occasions in the last six months with the cry of recall.  He needed a relationship with 
the Plaintiffs’ Mass Tort Bar.  He needed to begin to think “outside-the-box.”   
Enter Dick Scruggs.  Dick Scruggs at that point in time and still is a Plaintiffs’ 
lawyer from Pascagoula, Mississippi.  A Plaintiffs’ lawyer who led the charge on 
behalf of the Attorney Generals against the tobacco companies and achieved a $265 
billion resolution.   
He was truly the “rock star” of the Plaintiffs’ bar.  And David Wise hired this 
plaintiffs’ lawyer from Pascagoula, Mississippi to represent his company. 
                                                                
7Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
8Ortiz v. Fibrebard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
176 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 16:169 
Sid Backstrom is Mr. Scruggs’ partner.  And, Sid, can you tell us how that came 
about that you folks from Pascagoula, Mississippi came to represent corporate 
America. 
MR. BACKSTROM:  It was really fortuitous, obviously.  We had a doctor 
friend named Joe Cunningham, who lived in Crawford, Texas.  And he was taking 
some MBA coursework.  In one of his classes was a marketing vice president at 
Sulzer Orthopedics, the subsidiary of Sulzer who had created this product. 
They began talking about the situation the company was in.  And Joe said, “Well, 
you might want to talk to some friends of mine that are in this business and that 
maybe they can help you out.” 
So Joe called me and asked if we would be interested in talking to these guys 
about their problem.  And I said, “Well, let me go talk to Dick (Scruggs) and see if 
he’s interested.”   
So I went into Dick’s office and started explaining the problem to him, and he 
got this weird look in his eyes and said, “They don’t want us to defend them, do 
they?”  And I said, “No, it would be just to see about resolving the problem.”  And 
he said, “I don’t know if I really want to do that.”  And so I walked off and he 
probably began to question why he ever hired me. 
But nonetheless, I told my friend Joe, I said, “Why don’t you tell him we’re 
going to meet with him in a couple weeks.”  We had a trial in California.  On the 
way back from California, I told Dick, “We’re going to have to make a stop in Texas 
to see some people.”  Then I broke the news to him that I committed him to a 
meeting.  He probably again questioned why he hired me.   
And we had the meeting.  And the one thing that struck us when we met with the 
General Counsel, David Wise, and the President of Orthopedics, was that they were 
worried more than anything about the patients that had been implanted with this 
product, and they wanted to do the right thing.  And that struck Dick and he instantly 
wanted to help them.   
So we began the process at that point about trying to figure out what we could do.  
And some months later, after going from Orthopedics to Medica to Medica in 
Switzerland, we were hired to save them from bankruptcy.  That was our job, get 
them out of the litigation without them having to file bankruptcy. 
MR. KENNEDY:  Well, with that as Sid and Mr. Scruggs’s sole mission to save 
the company, there was only one way to save the company.  That was to settle the 
case with all 26,000 patients represented by hundreds of different lawyers.   
If they settled the case with 95 percent of the people, that 5 percent would have 
the opportunity to opt-out, go get jury verdicts and bankrupt the company.  And, 
again, remember, they couldn’t put together a class action settlement that forced 
everyone into the settlement.  They had to resolve this case with 26,000 people, 
probably more significantly, hundreds of different lawyers, on a voluntary basis.   
The first question, I suppose, would have been who do we negotiate with?  There 
are already a thousand state court cases filed and there are 300 federal cases filed.  
Well, the 300 federal cases that had been filed were consolidated into the Northern 
District of Ohio in front of Judge O’Malley in federal court here by the MDL Panel, 
a panel of seven judges, which sometimes sits in Washington, D.C., depending on 
the season.  
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Pursuant to federal statute § 1407, all 300 federal cases were consolidated here in 
front of Judge O’Malley.9  They chose to negotiate with the leadership appointed by 
Judge O’Malley of the federal cases. 
Their second problem, though, and second immediate issue was that of timing.  
The litigation was simply moving too fast.  There were going to be enough jury 
verdicts to bankrupt the company before they ever had an opportunity to resolve the 
case and attempt to settle it and sell it to 26,000 people.   
The litigation was moving so fast because the Plaintiffs’ Bar, which has become 
very sophisticated in these cases, had done a financial analysis of Sulzer, had looked 
at their potential exposure.  And the Plaintiffs’ Bar knew that Sulzer was going 
bankrupt.   
So the Plaintiffs’ Bar was moving as fast as they could into courthouses to get 
jury verdicts, to get paid before the bankruptcy.  And nobody moves into the 
courthouse and faster to a jury trial than the Texans.  In Texas, when a mass tort 
arises, the Texas lawyers informally organize.  They throw money into a pot to cover 
discovery.  Then they file lawsuits all around Texas, decide which court, which 
judge will move the case the fastest, and they do their discovery in that court.   
Now, the folks that move the second fastest in the country, oddly enough, are the 
Californians.  You don’t usually think of them moving fast, but in this context they 
move the second fastest.  They have the ability to move rapidly in this context, 
because they have a state consolidating statute.  Where we have a federal MDL 
consolidating statute 1407, they have the same type of state statute in California.10  
And judges in California will lobby to have the cases consolidated in front of them.  
It’s prestigious.   
So the case gets consolidated in front of a judge in California, they’re not going 
to take it and put it on the back burner.  They’re going to put it in the front burner 
and push the case.   
In addition to that, California has a preference statute.  If you file a lawsuit in 
California and you can establish with the trial judge you have a limited life 
expectancy, you are guaranteed a trial within 180 days.   
To compound this problem, the majority of the cases were in Texas and 
California, the two states that could move into the courthouse faster than anywhere 
else in the country. 
So with no time to waste, Mr. Scruggs and Sid began to negotiate with the 
leadership in the federal case.  Within thirty days or forty-five days, depending on 
where we actually started the negotiation, we had reached a relatively complex 
settlement that involved the payment of $600 million over a seven-year period.   
                                                                
928 U.S.C. § 1407; see also, In re Inter-op Hip Prosthesis Liability Litigation, 204 F.R.D. 
330, 336 (N.D. Ohio 2001).  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, three different federal plaintiffs 
filed motions with the Federal Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (“MDL Panel”), 
seeking to consolidate and centralize 30 of the federal lawsuits.  MDL docket no. 1401.  On 
June 19, 2001, the MDL Panel granted these motions, consolidating and transferring all related 
pending federal litigation to the Northern District of Ohio and assigning oversight of the MDL 
proceedings to the undersigned. Thus, virtually all of the federal cases involving the Inter-Op 
acetabular shell have either been transferred to this Court or are in the process of being 
transferred to this Court. 
10CA. R. USDCTCD Civ. Rule 83-1. 
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But the question still remained:  How are we going to get 26,000 people to 
voluntarily participate in this resolution?  Well, the settlement agreement had, this 
original settlement agreement had a provision, a lien provision, which required 
Sulzer to put a lien on all of its assets, including its insurance proceeds.  A lien in 
favor of everyone who chose to participate in the resolution.   
This meant if you opted out of the settlement, went and got a jury verdict, you 
were going to have to wait seven years to get paid on your jury verdict, because you 
were going to have to wait until the last penny got paid to the last person who 
participated in the resolution.   
Now, this was a very controversial provision.  And under Rule 23, this resolution 
needed to receive preliminary approval, along with this lien provision, from the trial 
court.  So Sulzer and the federal Plaintiffs’ lawyer filed a motion in front of Judge 
O’Malley for preliminary approval of this settlement with its lien provision.   
And, Judge, if you can tell us how that happened. 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  All right.  The irony of this is all this stuff was 
going on in the background and, you know, I felt like one of those people that was 
the last to know.  I would run into Eric Kennedy at the court meeting and he said, 
“Oh, I think this MDL is coming to you.”  I said, what are you talking about?  He 
said, “You know, the hip case.”  I had no idea.   
There had apparently been a case filed, there was immediately a judicial order of 
transfer.  It was sitting in front of the MDL.  I never looked at it.  Federal judges 
don’t.  We wait until the MDL Panel makes their decision.  I had no idea they were 
even considering sending it to the Northern District of Ohio.   
I then the next day got a phone call from a friend of mine who was the Attorney 
General of Mississippi, who said, you know, and I would love to be able to imitate 
his accent, but I can’t, but he said, there’s some good old boys from Mississippi 
coming up to be in front of you.  And I’m not here to lobby for one side or the other, 
because the good old boys are on both sides, but I just want you to know that treat 
them nicely and they’re not bad guys. 
And I hung up the phone and I said to my law clerk, I said, David, I think there’s 
something going on that we don’t know about.  Next thing we know, we get an order 
saying that 300 cases had been transferred to us.  And so we set the process in 
motion.   
We set down an initial status conference.  We issued an order based on the 
complex litigation, which we were kind of learning as we would go, to get the 
process rolling.  And we scheduled a very first meeting.   
Eric calls David and, before the very first meeting says, “Just wanted to give you 
a heads-up that instead of this being a case management conference, we’re also 
going to ask you to give preliminary approval to a settlement and to conditionally 
certify a class in this case.”   
Now, I have not met a single lawyer, I haven’t seen anyone, and they’re telling 
me before they even get here, forget about scheduling depositions or interrogatories, 
we’re going to settle this case. 
Partially because I felt like things had been going on behind my back before this 
point, and partially because I didn’t really know fully what I was doing, I decided to 
do all of this in a lot more than the open-end preliminary approval that normally 
occurs.   
Normally the preliminary approval for a settlement or preliminary or conditional 
class certification, it’s one of those things where four or five lawyers come into the 
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judge’s chambers and say, “Judge, this is a really good deal.”  And the judge says, 
“Well, it may or may not be, but I’ll give you the preliminary nod that you need and 
we’ll have a full fairness hearing later and figure it out.” 
In this case, the lawyer showed up thinking that that might happen, but it didn’t.  
I, instead, had an open court hearing with respect to the issue, where the lawyers had 
to air the provisions of what they were proposing.  And, in fact, allowed a sort of 
mini-objection process right up front.   
So within the first two weeks of having the case really before us, we had two 
different hearings where hundreds of lawyers attended these hearings.   
We were in the Old Courthouse and the doors were open and people were spread 
out into the hallway.  Two different hearings where we also received daily fax-after 
fax-after-fax from various parties objecting to some of what was being proposed. 
Ultimately, despite the objections, we issued a preliminary approval and 
conditional certification, but again, instead of it being, you know, behind closed 
doors, we issued a fifty-plus-page opinion setting forth at least our explanation as to 
why we were, at this stage, rejecting the objections. 
The biggest objection was to the lien provision.  The irony of it is that there were 
many Plaintiffs’ lawyers in state court who didn’t like the lien provision because 
they basically said it discouraged people from opting out.  They used all kinds of 
words like saying, the opt-out provision became illusory, they threw around due 
process.  I always love that.  Lawyers love to throw due process around when they’re 
not sure what else to argue.  They kept saying, “You can’t do this, because then 
we’re basically making it less palatable to opt-out.” 
Well, as I pointed out in my order, isn’t that the point of a class action 
settlement?  It is supposed to be good.  It is supposed to be something you want to 
participate in.  And that just because the opt-out wasn’t better than participating in 
class settlement didn’t mean it was completely illusory.   
So I spent a fair amount of time categorically rejecting the notion that the liens on 
their face rendered the proposed settlement inadequate, but left open a lot of room 
for the expression of concern about the settlement, generally, and about the fact, I at 
least thought, and I think I flagged this pretty well to Counsel on both sides, that the 
settlement wasn’t quite sweet enough in terms of the amount of money that was 
going to the class and the benefits that were flowing to the class. 
MR. KENNEDY:  Judge, let me just ask you, even at that stage of the 
proceedings, and we are in a law school with law school professors that are present, 
Arthur Miller, I think, law professor formerly from Harvard presented on behalf of 
the proponents of the resolution.  And throughout the proceedings, over the next 
several months, Professor Issacharoff from Columbia wrote various briefs.   
From the bench, what is your thought about lawyers standing aside in certain 
circumstances and bringing in law professors to argue as relates to certain points of 
law?  
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  I have to tell you that dialogue that I had with 
Arthur Miller was one of the most fun times I have had as a lawyer or a judge.   
Arthur Miller comes in and he wants to argue–the issue that he wanted to argue 
was whether or not the liens really did render the opt-out illusory, whether there was 
a due process issue, and he also was going to talk about the All Writs Act.11 
                                                                
1128 U.S.C. § 1651 (2003). 
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He came to speak, and I had a very long dialogue with him from the bench where 
we went back and forth on a series of questions.  One of my other law clerks, that 
was his first day, his very first day, and this is what he hears.   
He hears Eric Kennedy versus Dick Scruggs and all these prominent state court 
lawyers, but then this dialog with Arthur Miller.  And at the end of the day he says, 
“Is this what it’s always like?”  I said, “Oh, yeah, sure.”  Two years later he’s still 
wishing we could go back to that very first day.   
But I have to say that I think that any one of you all are capable of making the 
same argument.  And I’m not–if your question was, was I very impressed with the 
fact that it was Arthur Miller, did that change my view of the substance?  I think 
probably not.  I think you’re sort of underselling the ability of any one of you to 
make the very same arguments and to make the same impression on a federal judge. 
So having said that I enjoyed it, I’m not sure it was really a necessary thing.  I 
wasn’t offended by it, if that is part of your question. 
MR. KENNEDY:  Part of my question.  I’ll continue on with the story.   
Judge O’Malley granted preliminary approval.  What we had hoped was this lien 
provision would force voluntary participation.  That concept of a voluntary 
participation became rather interesting.  Like my parents used to have voluntary 
participation; you don’t have to clean your room, but if you don’t, you’ll be 
grounded for the rest of your life. 
It had the opposite effect.  It made the state court lawyers, number one, they got 
angry.  Number two, they immediately appealed under 23(f) to the Sixth Circuit 
Judge O’Malley’s preliminary approval of the resolution.12   
And finally, the state court lawyers embarked upon a campaign of vindictive 
discovery.  They noticed depositions of Sulzer employees from Maine to New 
Mexico.  They managed for the next ninety days to get forty-one cases scheduled for 
trial.  Understand, we were eight months post recall and they’ve got forty-one cases 
scheduled for trial. 
This had two effects.  Number one, Sulzer couldn’t carry on business as an 
orthopedic device manufacturer.  I mean their CEO was in one courtroom, he was in 
another courtroom the next day, deposition in another state.  They had manufacturers 
across the country.  They couldn’t carry on business. 
The second problem this created was that Judge O’Malley had approved a 
preliminary settlement.  We needed to take this preliminary settlement and take it 
from that point to a final settlement.  And three major issues had been left open.   
Number one, we hadn’t done discovery yet with respect to Sulzer AG, the 
grandparent, so we didn’t understand their liability picture and whether or not they 
should be contributing money to the resolution. 
Number two, there was an issue with respect to a $165 million policy and its 
application to this resolution.  And third, we needed to do more discovery so we 
could gain a better understanding of the Sulzer Company’s true ability to finance this 
resolution. 
We simply couldn’t do that discovery to take this case from preliminary 
settlement to a final settlement.  Couldn’t be done. 
                                                                
12FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
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Enter at that point now the All Writs Act.13  A motion to stay all state court 
litigation was filed by Sulzer asking Judge O’Malley from the federal system to stop 
1,500 state court proceedings.    
Judge? 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  This is the one that I keep getting grief over–
originally there was a request to stay all the state court litigation.  And it was before 
the preliminary approval on conditional certification, they asked me to do it all at 
once.   
I pretty much had signaled to the lawyers that it probably was not a wise 
decision, and that it was probably premature.  There also had not been any state court 
verdicts.  So as much as they could cry and scream that the sky was going to fall if 
we let any of these state court cases go to trial and that the companies were going to 
be put out of business, I didn’t have anything other than their estimate that–you 
know, other than their claim that Texans always give big verdicts, so therefore, we’re 
going to have this terrible series of verdicts out there.   
So they smartly withdrew that request, which took a lot of the wind out of some 
of the state court lawyers’ sails during the preliminary approval process, and then 
came back later.   
They came back after the preliminary approval had already been issued by me 
and I had made all the determinations I needed to make under Rule 23, after I put in 
place an aggressive case management order that required amazing amounts of 
discovery all over the world, at the same time.   
After they had obtained the agreement of Sulzer AG, the Swiss parent, to 
voluntarily participate in discovery, despite the fact that they had huge defenses to 
jurisdiction and really didn’t arguably even need to participate in discovery, because 
none of us really appeared to have jurisdiction over them, one of the Texas cases 
went to trial.   
So they walked into a Texas court and they basically let the chips fall where they 
may.  They admitted liability and lost a $15 million verdict.  And then they came to 
me and said, “That’s one case, Judge.  There are forty-one set for trial between 
September and December.”  Forty-one cases to be tried by December.   
And they said, “We can’t do what you want us to do.  And your preliminary 
approval and conditional certification are meaningless, unless you issue this order.” 
The All Writs Act, this is a classic, you know, civil procedure issue, but the All 
Writs Act and the Anti-Injunction Act play together.14  The Anti-Injunction Act says 
federal courts may not enjoin state court litigation, except, and there are three 
exceptions, only one of which really applies.  
But the one that applied here was in aid of the court’s jurisdiction for its own 
judgments.  And then the All Writs Act gives the court affirmative authority to issue 
a writ and issue an injunction if you fall within the exceptions to the Anti-Injunction 
Act.15  So the two parallel, they work together.  There have been a lot of cases that 
have discouraged the overuse of the All Writs Act by Federal Courts.   
                                                                
1328 U.S.C. § 1651 (2003). 
14Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2003). 
15Id. 
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In this case, I found that in the context of the preliminarily approved settlement, 
facing the forty-one trials that would have destroyed any possibility of even 
assessing the settlement, as well as the fact they were only talking about a matter of 
months.   
Again, it’s important, as Eric says, we’re only eight months past recall.  And my 
theory is there’s virtually no harm to these Plaintiffs’ lawyers if they have to sit back, 
or to the Plaintiffs, for a matter of months before the final fairness hearing, especially 
when they were being handed discovery done very aggressively by very competent 
lawyers, including discovery that they never would have obtained in that time frame. 
So in those circumstances, I did issue a writ enjoining all the state court 
litigation.  And, of course, was immediately appealed.  The writ was immediately 
appealed.  And this, again, is a civil procedure teacher’s dream, but what happened is 
the writ was appealed.  And at the same time, remember, the conditional approval is 
also appealed at the same time.  So both of them are up there. 
The Defendants make a huge tactical mistake.  They moved to dismiss the 
appeal.  They moved to dismiss the appeal on grounds that the writ is not really an 
injunction; therefore, it’s not immediately appealable. 
So they tried to argue on purely procedural grounds that it was not appealable.  
Because they thought they had this purely procedural argument, the Defendants 
chose not to join issue on the merits at all.  The Defendants refused to talk about the 
settlement and how wonderful it was.  They refused to talk about the basis for the 
writ. 
So the Court of Appeals was faced on a motion day, so you had three judges who 
get the pleadings in the morning and decide that afternoon whether to dismiss the 
appeal.  And they have before them this amazing brief that’s this thick from the state 
court lawyers saying that I had issued preliminary approval for a settlement that was 
completely violative of every decision ever issued in the Sixth Circuit, especially 
Telectronics, and everything I had done was horrible.   
Then we have this little brief from the Defendants saying, this writ is really not 
an injunction.  They drew the Telectronics judge.  The Telectronics judge says, 
“Well, since they’re not disputing this, everything the state lawyers are saying is 
correct.” 
So they vacated the writ and then said, “Besides, we don’t think we’re going to 
like this settlement.  There’s been no briefing on either issue.  They’ve never read 
any of my opinions.”  And they said, “We don’t think we’re going to like this.” 
Well, the Defendants then got smart, as I understand it, having realized what they 
did, they filed a motion for reconsideration, this time asking the Court of Appeals to 
at least read the two opinions I had issued, and to at least read their version of what 
happened.   
And the Sixth Circuit, almost as quickly as it vacated the writ, reinstated the writ 
and set the matter down for briefing, combining the issue on the writ and the 
preliminary certification at the same time. 
So having had a real scare there for a few days, the Plaintiffs and Defendants 
lawyers in the federal case were at least relieved a little to have the Sixth Circuit 
reverse itself, and as was I, after all the work that we had done.    
MR. BACKSTROM:  We weren’t in charge of briefing on this case. 
MR. KENNEDY:  To step back a minute, when Judge O’Malley issued the stay, 
stopping the 1,500 state cases, that meant no more document production, no more 
interrogatories, no more depositions, no more pretrials, no more trials in 1,500 cases.   
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Tom Schultz and Luke Lesellis, California lawyers, were in the process of 
empanelling a jury in a Sulzer hip case when the Sulzer lawyer raised his hand and 
walked up to the bench and put on the judge’s bench Judge O’Malley’s order that 
had been signed moments before staying every state court case in the country, and 
the judge dismissed the jury.   
So what went from a angry group of state court lawyers, now became a riotous 
mob.  The e-mails, the letters, the name calling were very interesting. 
But at that point in time we were probably at our greatest odds between the state 
court lawyers and the federal lawyers.  Judge O’Malley did something that, in 
retrospect, and I’ll talk about it later, in retrospect, was probably one of the critical 
turning points of the case.   
In October what Judge O’Malley did was create a state court discovery 
committee to act in conjunction with the Plaintiffs lawyers in the federal case; to do 
discovery together and to take this from a preliminary settlement to a final 
settlement. 
Judge, your thoughts on the creation of that state court discovery committee?  
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  As I said, I felt one of the things that justified the 
extraordinary remedy of the writ was the fact that we were allowing this discovery to 
be shared with anyone.  So any discovery in the federal MDL, I ruled, would be 
completely open and available for all the state court claimants.  
And my hope was that, they would have less argument that they were prejudiced 
by the stay, knowing full well that the Sixth Circuit has already looked a little 
askance at the writ and that there needed to be a basis for some of what I was saying.   
I thought that if I also invited the state court lawyers to help decide what 
discovery would be done, they would then have less argument with respect to their 
ability to say that they were prejudiced by the stay, because really they weren’t being 
stayed.  They were participating.   
The other reason, frankly, and it’s sort of a classic, you know, that notion that if 
someone invests in you, they become invested in you forever.  My thought was if the 
state court lawyers became involved and started dictating the manner in which this 
MDL was proceeding, or at least participated in dictating and worked with the 
lawyers here, that they would become co-opted.  I don’t mean co-opted in a bad way.  
I mean co-opted in beginning to understand what these lawyers, both the Plaintiff 
lawyers and Defense lawyers, or the settlement lawyers, Mr. Scruggs and Mr. 
Backstrom, were attempting to accomplish.  
And would see that the course they were on would likely put the company in 
bankruptcy and likely render many of these claimants penniless in terms of their 
ability to recover anything. 
And there was a dance a little bit between the state court lawyers and I for a 
while.  I proposed this, I said they could ask to be on the committee.  And, they all 
were calling each other saying, “Well, we could all not and then she won’t have any 
committee, but then again, I don’t want somebody else to ask and then I don’t get 
on.”   
And they did a dance.  And on the very last day that I had allotted for this, all of a 
sudden I get these series of requests to be on the committee. 
And ultimately, I needed to–it served all of those purposes.  Even to the extent 
that once they got into the discovery and started participating in it, they stipulated to 
a continuation of the stay.  And they asked the Sixth Circuit to stay its consideration 
of the writ.   
184 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 16:169 
So in other words, they saw the wisdom of the writ going forward, and they got 
very involved, ultimately, not only in the discovery process, but, as I hoped, in the 
settlement process as well. 
MR. KENNEDY:  And our view of what transpired thereafter with respect to the 
court’s writ.  The court put together this committee, the state court committee.  And 
we began to go about our business working together.   
The court did make it very clear that we would play nice together.  And if we 
didn’t, that we would be in front of the court answering to any complaints that either 
side had. 
But then, as the court said, the very bad thing happened.  And that was out of 
nowhere to us the Sixth Circuit issued the order lifting the stay pending their 
determination as to whether or not the stay was appropriate. 
What that sparked was the very next day, Don Barrett from Mississippi and 
myself went out to Las Vegas where, fortuitously, there was a mass tort seminar.  
And there was hundreds of state court lawyers that had gathered.  And we had a 
meeting with those lawyers out there.   
And ironically enough, the meeting that we had with about a hundred state court 
lawyers was in a room right next to the wedding chapel in the Las Vegas casino.  
Tom Tirtle from Texas commented, he wondered which group was going to entertain 
more broken promises on that afternoon.   
But the state court lawyers at that meeting agreed to voluntarily, at least these 
hundred lawyers agreed to voluntarily not proceed with any trials, even though the 
Sixth Circuit had lifted the stay.  The problem was that there were still hundreds of 
other plaintiffs lawyers throughout the country that hadn’t made that agreement.   
I think that the Sixth Circuit issued this order on a Tuesday, and by Friday, there 
was already a case scheduled for trial the following week.  And it was just a matter 
of weeks before we had the other cases put back on the trial schedule.    
As the court said, the Sixth Circuit motion to reconsider, which is usually not 
worth much more than the paper you write it on, miraculously reversed its decision 
of eight days before.  And we were back in the ball game.   
We proceeded to do what the court ordered, we proceeded to do our discovery so 
we could take this preliminary resolution and turn it into a final settlement.  As the 
court said, we were on a very aggressive schedule.   
Within sixty days Sulzer produced 300,000 pages of documents.  The problem 
was 100,000 of them were in German.  We had 12 interpreters working seven days a 
week translating documents.  We took depositions in London, Vienna, in Toronto, 
Canada, in Austin, Corpus Christi, and Houston, Texas.   
We hired a myriad of different experts, financial experts to educate us with 
respect to the financial abilities and pitfalls and just understand how sound Sulzer 
was and all the Sulzer companies was with respect to their ability to fund the 
resolution.   
By the beginning of February we were ready, once again, to sit down with Sulzer 
and try to negotiate this from a preliminary resolution to a final resolution. 
We negotiated in Vienna, Washington, D.C., New York, but most of the 
negotiation was done in Cleveland.  During one stint of negotiation in Cleveland, the 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers, or the Plaintiff negotiating group, we would sit and meet at 7:00 
a.m. at the coffee shop at the Ritz every morning at the same table and, you know, a 
couple tables down the Defense negotiating team would meet at 7 every morning.   
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At 8:00 o’clock we would go to our office and we would negotiate from 8 until 
noon.  At noon Dick Scruggs and I would meet with Judge O’Malley to report the 
status of negotiation.  We would come back at 1 and negotiate from 1 to 6.  We had 
happy hour from 6 to 7, we went to dinner and we went to bed.   
The next day we were up at the same tables at the Ritz.  And then noon to Judge 
O’Malley, 6 having dinner, day-after-day-after-day.  And about the eighth day Ed 
Liss from Houston, Texas, looked at me and said, Eric, “I’m starting to think that 
maybe I’m caught in that movie ‘Groundhog Day,’16 where Bill Murray has got to 
repeat the same day over and over and over again until he gets it right.”   
Finally, on March 8th, at 8:30 at night in Judge O’Malley’s chambers we 
presented to her a memorandum of understanding outlining the final settlement; a $1 
billion resolution that did not contain any provision as it related to liens.   
Now, I remember handing Judge O’Malley the memoranda of understanding, it 
was kind of handwritten out, and saying, “Judge, other than a few details, we have 
reached a final settlement.”   
Judge O’Malley read it for about five minutes and looked at us, I’m not sure she 
remembers, but she said, “A few details?  The holes in this agreement are big enough 
to drive a truck through.”    
The judge was right.  It took us thirty more days of discussion to close those few 
details, but finally we did.  We closed the details.  We had a final resolution, about a 
hundred-page document.   
But the challenge really at this point had just begun, because now we had to get 
26,000 class members and a hundred different lawyers, hundreds of different 
lawyers, all at different levels of understanding and sophistication of this mechanism, 
we had to get them all to participate.  
Because, understand, if ten percent opted out, if fifty Plaintiffs opted out, we 
already let one case escape to the trial process and it amounted in a $15 million 
verdict with three Plaintiffs over seventy-years-of-age.  So any significant number of 
opt-outs would have destroyed the resolution.   
And the resolution had a “walk-away” provision, which was common.  The walk-
away provision says that Sulzer, if they at their discretion do not like the number of 
opt-outs, they can walk away from the resolution, because why would Sulzer put a 
billion dollars into a resolution and then have a handful of opt-outs go to trial and 
cause them into bankruptcy?  So we had to essentially bring everyone into this 
resolution. 
Now, Judge O’Malley’s creation of that state court committee had taken us a 
long way down that road, because the major players in the state court system that had 
the largest inventory of cases had been sitting next to us at the negotiating table.   
So this was no longer a federal court resolution or a state court resolution.  This 
was our resolution on the Plaintiffs’ side.  So we had gone a long way down that 
road. 
To get the rest of the way down that road, we created a website to explain the 
resolution and answer questions.  We created an 800 number.  We had three 
conference calls with an excess of 200 lawyers on the conference calls where we 
explained the resolution.  We answered questions.   
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If any lawyer was thinking about opting out his or her clients, somebody was on 
a plane and sitting in their office talking to them about their choice of whether or not 
to stay in the resolution, or to opt-out and potentially cause the whole thing to sink 
into bankruptcy.   
The fact that Dow Corning, the breast implant litigation, was still in bankruptcy 
court without the payment of a dime to any woman after seven years was a strong 
selling point for us with respect to the bankruptcy potential.17 
As we were working towards getting all 26,000 folks in, we were also working in 
preparation for the fairness hearing.  Because under Rule 26, or Rule 23, any final 
resolution has to go to a fairness hearing for the trial court to determine that this is a 
fair and reasonable resolution.18 
So in May we had a two day fairness hearing in front of Judge O’Malley 
requesting that she determine that this resolution was fair and reasonable.   
Judge and Sid, your views of the fairness hearing? 
MR. BACKSTROM:  The fairness hearing was quite a challenge.  There had 
been a significant amount of discovery that had gone into it.  And there was just a lot 
to tell in terms of the product defect and the insurance picture and the structure of the 
companies, and so it was just a real challenge to figure out how we were going to do 
that. 
But it was a cooperative effort at that point, because we had not only the MDL 
lawyers working with us, but the state court lawyers as well. 
So at the end of the day, I think we put forth a pretty good showing that this was 
the best deal for everybody involved, including patients and their lawyers and the 
company as well. 
So at the end of the day, we felt pretty good about it.  And we went into the 
fairness hearing with maybe a half-dozen objections, who maintained their 
objections through the fairness hearing, which was indicative in a class action of 
40,000 participants of how good the deal was. 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  After having an entire year of every single 
proceeding ending up with someone yelling at someone else, and at times, I admit, it 
was me sometimes yelling, but not very often, but it was usually the lawyers yelling 
at each other or yelling at me.   
This was, as David and I commented afterward, it was like a “love fest.”  It was 
the strangest fairness hearing I ever imagined.  Usually you have objections from all 
over the place.  Usually you have a lot of battles.  By the point of the fairness 
hearing, not only had we co-opted most of the real lawyers who had cases in state 
court, but Eric and his crew had put together an amazing show.   
I mean they already had Judge McMonagle involved with his experience with 
running trusts.  He was able to say, “This is doable, we can do this.  Even though 
we’re talking about 26,000 Plaintiffs, even though we’re talking about a billion 
dollars, we can figure out a way to handle this settlement structure.”   
They had Vic Goldberg from University Hospitals who came in and did an 
amazing presentation on exactly what the science was and how you determine scope 
of the class.  It was fascinating.  
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And one of the most important pieces was they had one of the state court 
lawyers, one of the ones who was most vocal objecting in the beginning, come in and 
take the stand and explain to the world how bad bankruptcy court can be in a mass 
tort contest and why putting this company out of business would be a huge mistake. 
There also was a big piece of the settlement monies coming from certain of the 
Swiss entities that I’m fairly convinced nobody would have been able to get to from 
the U.S., that were so protected in terms of their ability to fight about piercing the 
corporate veil or fight about jurisdiction.  There was a large cash infusion from those 
entities that was partially borne out of the desire to have the U.S. company stay in 
business, but also partially borne out of this desire that Sid referred to before; they 
really wanted to have this money for these claimants, which is–you shouldn’t be so 
surprised, Sid, that corporate America sometimes feels that way. 
So the fairness hearing was so perfectly put together by the time they got there 
and there were so few objections that it really was–I think a “love fest” is a fair 
description of it.  There were even claimants, people, you know, hip claimants were 
in the room telling me how thrilled they were that this was going to happen.  And 
that’s kind of an emotional piece of it. 
MR. KENNEDY:  Judge O’Malley did provide final approval to the resolution 
at the end of the day on 26,000 class members.  There were less than ten opt-outs.  
As Sid said, at the end of the day there were seven people that objected to any aspect 
of the resolution.  And unheard of in a mass tort class action, there were no appeals.   
Sulzer, I think, today remains a model to the Plaintiffs’ Bar, to the Defense Bar, 
to the judiciary with respect to the resolution of this type of case.  I think it’s 
something that we are all proud of.  It represented a situation where the most amount 
of compensation was able to go to the greatest numbers of victims.   
It represented a resolution whereby this company was allowed to stay in business, 
that provided valuable jobs to the various communities where they did business 
across the country.  It allowed the corporation to continue to make valuable medical 
products.    
I think in a sense, it represents a bit of a nullification of the law, because under 
the circumstances of this case, where liabilities exceeds assets, I think the law tells 
you to go to bankruptcy court.  That you go to bankruptcy court, even though the 
Plaintiffs don’t want to go there and even though the Defendants don’t want to go 
there. 
So I think that it represents a situation where the Plaintiffs’ Mass Tort Bar came 
together with a corporation, with the great patience and wisdom of a court, and 
formed a resolution that provided the greatest benefits for everybody involved. 
By November 3rd, two years early, the entire $1 billion was deposited into the 
settlement trust.  The movement of that $1 billion out to 26,000 class members is the 
job of the Honorable Judge Jim McMonagle. 
HONORABLE McMONAGLE:  I actually just felt like stretching.  I was 
wondering, Eric is very quick on his feet, because I was trying to figure out what 
kind of segue is he going to use to make the job of a claims administrator sound 
interesting. 
You know, a number of people have asked me, “How did I become a claims 
administrator?”  Let me tell you, digress very quickly, because I didn’t know what a 
claims administrator was, never heard of that term before I heard of Sulzer.   
A number of years ago there was young lawyer trying a case in front of me when 
I was a judge.  And Judge O’Malley back there was representing a clothing store.  
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And the clothing store–it was a commercial free speech case.  And her client was 
advertising in the papers that their clothes were sold at approximately half of every 
other clothing store in Cleveland.   
And so, therefore, they came in and her defense was the truth, they were selling 
at about half.  She brought in exhibits.  There were about ten suits.  I live in Chagrin 
Falls.  And the evidence started coming out slowly.   
I never met her before in my life, didn’t know her.  She knew a lot about me, 
because all of a sudden, I get this pattern that there are suits bought out Chagrin 
Boulevard, all the way down into the Village of Chagrin Falls.  Back then I was a 
size 38 regular, and they were all 38 regular.   
So the reason I tell that story is from that period of time, there isn’t anything that 
she ever does without some serious thought beforehand as to what’s going on in 
strategic planning.  
But I also point out that how do you become a claims administrator?  That’s part 
of it.  You know, everybody, the vast majority of the folks here are students.  You 
know, Cleveland is a very, very small collegial town, particularly when it comes to 
the legal community.  From that point on, Judge O’Malley and I had a significant 
amount of professional interaction.   
As a matter of fact, at one point I had been nominated to be on the Federal bench, 
that Bill Clinton was able to beat George Bush, and basically Kate has taken over the 
spot I had.   
But the other point is Eric Kennedy, and these folks have to basically decide who 
will be the claims administrator.  Eric Kennedy, I knew him before he was famous 
for all the things he has done.  He was a rugby player where we butted heads 
together.  And he was also a house painter.  
So Cleveland is a small, small town.  And over the years, what you finally do is 
you do things with people who you trust.  So that’s a long way to say, you know, 
when you have interrelationships with any of your professional people that you deal 
with, make sure you conduct yourselves at all times in the highest of ethical ways in 
your personal and professional manners, because people come back and hopefully–
and put people in some positions of which they need someone who is going to trust. 
What do I do?  Well, you know what, they told me what to do.  They have a 
settlement agreement and the settlement agreement says, what you are supposed to 
do is pay out a specific amount of money to a number of people.  There’s basically 
three or four categories.  The largest category are the people who have had defective 
hips and the other ones who have received defective knees, that they can get up to 
$160,000 in a fairly quick process.  
And then we also have another process whereby people who are claiming that 
they are extraordinarily injured, and there is a fund of–really a limited fund of one 
hundred million dollars of which it will be within my discretion to try and determine 
how much any individual claimant will be entitled to receive out of that. 
The claims administrator does four things.  Again, this is laid out in the 
settlement agreement itself, because, you know, as Yogi Berra said one time, “If you 
don’t know where you’re going, you’re going to be lost when you get there.” 
The settlement agreement tells you where you’re going and it tells you what you 
do when you get there.  That’s all we’re trying to do here.  Because I have been 
involved in a number of these trusts in the past, and that all well-intentioned people 
have described very excellent plans by which they are going to indemnify people 
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who have been injured by a product at one time or another.  But if you don’t get the 
money to the claimants as soon as possible, the trust funds have some difficulty. 
In this case we have expended, really, in excess of fifty percent of the monies, 
really over $600 million to the various claimants already.  Now, as far as my job, I 
have hired a firm in Richmond, Virginia that does the day-to-day work.  Their name 
is Brown Greer.  And to tell you the truth, it’s a law firm.  They have an actuary 
business by which they do claims processing.   
This is a big business throughout the country with the increase in mass torts, with 
the increase in the bankruptcies, that there has been a cottage business of law firms 
around the country which have been created, which is used for the processing of 
claims. 
But all I really do is look at each one of the claim forms that comes in.  And the 
settlement agreement says, look and see whether or not there’s been an implantation 
of a defective product, look and see whether or not there has been, by medical 
evidence, appropriate medical evidence proven to your satisfaction that there has 
been a revision of that.  Make sure that there wasn’t a trauma that caused the 
defectiveness, somebody didn’t fall off a ladder or something like that.  And make 
sure they filled out the claim forms.  And so, that’s really what my function is.   
Now, the other intricacy regarding these types of funds, not just Sulzer, but all 
the other funds, is that there always has to be a little bit of a crystal ball.  And to the 
best of everyone’s ability, they try and identify how many claims there will be filed 
in the future.   
And Sulzer has been probably the best I’ve ever seen, but there has still never 
been in the history of any type of resolution of mass torts a situation where any 
epidemiologist or forecasters or economists, or whatever they want to call 
themselves, has ever overestimated the number of claims which are going to be filed. 
You know, people do very interesting things and behaviors do change and claims 
rates do increase when all of a sudden there is a pot of money which is put out there. 
But all and all, it’s been a very exciting thing to do.  And luckily enough–and I’ll 
take that back.  Luck, you know, obviously is defined as when opportunity meets 
preparedness.  That’s happened.  I think if I use that definition, luckily enough, this 
Sulzer resolution of the mass tort under these circumstances has been one which can 
be an example to the legal community, an example to the corporate community that 
we can have situations whereby people, because of negligence or because of not 
willful acts, they get themselves into a situation where people can actually be paid a 
significant amount of money to indemnify them for their injuries, but also that the 
company itself is able to have some extended economic viability and go on to 
preserve the jobs and preserve the corporation itself. 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  I do want to say that I think Judge McMonagle is 
a little too modest.  There have been a lot of these cases that have gone to settlement 
and have fallen apart after-the-fact of approval because either the budget analysis 
were so far off or their mishandling of the settlement is unbelievable.   
I mean some of these, and I won’t name them, but some of these settlements 
really have blown up after the fact.  And it’s largely due to Judge McMonagle that 
that has not happened.  And that the level of effort that he has put in with Brown 
Greer has been outstanding. 
MR. KENNEDY:  I would say it’s the majority of them that don’t work during 
the claims administration process.  
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MS. BECKER:  Mr. Scruggs did want to be here in person.  He, obviously, sent 
a representative.  We’re very glad to have Sidney Backstrom with us today.  He was 
very kind enough to also prepare a videotape, which he did on Monday.  And so this 
videotape contains Mr. Scruggs’ view of this litigation.    
MR. SCRUGGS:  Thanks for allowing me to appear in the symposium by 
videoconference, or some form of modern technology.  I want to thank Professor 
Landever and Professor Becker for inviting me to appear before the Cleveland-
Marshall School of Law.  And thanks to all the faculty and students who are there. 
I want to tell you how much I appreciate being on a symposium in a program 
with people like Judge Kate O’Malley and Judge McMonagle, and my partner, Sid 
Backstrom, and my close friend and colleague, Eric Kennedy, to discuss some of the 
aspects of the Sulzer class action settlement. 
I’m just going–others can tell you, perhaps, in more detail who are there actually 
in person in front of you about the predicament that Sulzer Orthopedics found 
themselves in a couple of years ago, having manufactured artificial hips and knees 
that through an industrial accident were defective, had to be recalled.  Some tens of 
thousands of them had to be recalled after they had been implanted in patients.   
It put Sulzer in a very, a very unfortunate position, having been a medical device 
manufacturer for many decades, having made life-enhancing and life-saving medical 
devices to have had an accident like this.  And found themselves in the crosshairs of 
the American mass tort system.   
You probably know that Sulzer was a Swiss-based company with various 
subsidiaries, including Sulzer Orthopedics U.S.A., which manufactured the hips and 
the knees that were recalled. 
But their corporate structure did not lend itself to compartmentalizing, such that 
the entire corporate structure was ostensibly vulnerable to judgments and piercing 
the corporate veil, because of the way it was set up by the European lawyers that set 
up the corporate structure. 
So they found themselves being sued in various locales, what we call–many of 
them were what we call magic jurisdictions.  That is, venues where they are well-
known for coming in with high plaintiff verdicts.  And there was essentially the race 
to the courthouse for Sulzer’s assets.    
The company, while it made close to a hundred million dollars a year in profit, its 
assets were not worth a whole lot more than that.  Its value was mostly as a going 
concern.   
The company had only about–I say only, sounds like a lot, but it wasn’t given the 
liability they faced–250 or so million dollars in insurance.  Some of which was 
contested.  And had very little in the way of assets to make up any difference in what 
the insurance might pay. 
The company had a lot of goodwill.  Its sales remained strong.  Its reputation 
among the orthopedic surgeons and others who used its products remained strong, 
notwithstanding the recall. 
But it appeared that Sulzer, if it stayed the course in the litigation, in these 
various magic jurisdictions around the country, would have to file bankruptcy. 
Before I was called into it–for those of you who don’t know me, I probably 
should have introduced myself, I’m Richard Scruggs and I’m a trial lawyer.  I did 
defense work when I was right out of law school, but over the last twenty-some-odd-
years I’ve done nothing but plaintiffs work, and mostly mass tort.   
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I was involved in tobacco litigation, and before that the asbestos litigation, 
various other mass tort cases.   
Before I was contacted about this case, Sulzer had gone through amounts of its 
potential liability and its assets and insurance with which to respond to that potential 
liability, and had come to the conclusion that the bankruptcy was inevitable.   
I was contacted by an expert witness, a physician who lived in Texas where the 
Sulzer manufacturing plant was located.  The principal plant was located in Austin, 
Texas.  This expert witness, Dr. Joe Cunningham, who is the president, or former 
president of the Texas Medical Association, was an expert for us in litigation, and 
suggested to one of the executives, who was his neighbor, that they consider 
retaining a trial lawyer to give them some advice about how to extricate themselves 
from this mass tort dilemma.   
To make a long story short, I had a number of meetings with Sulzer, with their 
management.  They had defense counsel.  They had good defense counsel who were, 
naturally, resistant to the idea of a trial lawyer coming in and sort of directing the 
defense of the company. 
But that’s not what we were asked to do.  We were asked to come in and give 
them some, perhaps, “outside-of-the-box” thought about how they could extricate the 
company from mass tort, from this mass tort, and at the same time compensate the 
victims, while keeping the company in business.   
That was the real challenge here.  How do you stave off stampeding in the race to 
the courthouse, what legal device is available to do that, short of bankruptcy, to 
prevent the few assets of the company from being consumed by the very first 
plaintiffs who were able to get judgments and execute those judgments against the 
company’s assets; wherein, a few lucky plaintiffs would get virtually all of the assets 
and most would get nothing, because the company would be out of business in 
bankruptcy. 
So we set about to try to convince the management of Sulzer, we went to 
Switzerland on a number of occasions to meet first with their insurers and then with 
the same management of the company that we thought we had a plan that would 
work.   
And the plan that we ultimately came up with was a settlement, was a class 
action settlement. 
Now, to set the scene, a company that faced what Sulzer faced has very few 
options, other than what I’ll call “trench warfare,” to try every case, win some, lose 
some, delay the inevitable until the insurance is consumed.  Or file bankruptcy.   
The class action model has not proven very successful as a settlement vehicle.  
As those of you who have studied class action law in recent years know, the Rule 23 
big class action device, which is the limited fund, no opt-out class action device, 
which has been tried in a number of similar instances where a company has a limited 
number of assets, it’s only valuable as a going concern, and tries to capture all of the 
plaintiffs in the class action settlement, have not, that I know of, survived appeal.   
Some of them have proved at the trial court level and some settlements under 
23(b)(1)(b), but to not, to my knowledge, have they survived appeal for various 
reasons.   
The other class action settlement device is the 23(b)(3), or opt-out settlement 
device, where anyone who wants to can opt-out of a settlement.  Those who stay in 
get the settlement money.   
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The problem with that type of settlement, historically, is that the plaintiffs 
lawyers will settle the average or medium or minimally injured cases and opt-out 
their more serious cases.  And so that the company spends most of its money settling 
through the class action vehicle cases that are not that compelling, but having to then 
respond in court, again, with trials of the opt-out cases, which are usually the more 
serious. 
Those settlements really, I think, in a situation like Sulzer’s, are a bit of a fool’s 
game, because it will buy them time, but it won’t buy them peace, because they will 
ultimately be facing the same race to the courthouse with these more serious cases. 
In Sulzer what we decided to do was a 23(b)(3) opt-out settlement.  Similar to the 
one I just described, but with one wrinkle.  That is, to give a lien on all of the 
company’s assets, income, revenues, work in process, inventory, cash.  You name it.   
Give a lien on the company, lock, stock and barrel, to the class to secure the 
payments to the class plaintiffs.  That presented a dilemma to anyone who opted out.  
They could certainly opt out and get a judgment, but if they got a judgment, their 
judgment lien would be subordinate and be behind the lien of the class. 
So it would pay at least half of its income and issue stock to the class, to actually 
give a preference to the class in favor of those who opted out. 
The settlement on those terms was approved preliminarily by Judge O’Malley.  
Some of the opposing trial lawyers appealed that.  And the appeal was at least 
temporarily granted and the All Writs Act injunction that stopped the opt out 
lawsuits from going forward was lifted.   
We got an expedited hearing in the Court of Appeals.  And on the morning of the 
hearing ended up with a settlement with those who had taken the appeal such that the 
injunction remained in place long enough to sort of renegotiate the terms of the 
settlement. 
The terms of the settlement were renegotiated such that the class was given all of 
the insurance of the company, an issuance of stock, other cash, and virtually all of 
the free assets the company had.  The sum total of all that was slightly in excess of 
$1 billion. 
But the company had the right to walk away from the settlement if opt-outs 
exceeded a subjective number that the company thought it could live with.   
It turned out that initially I think there were fifty or sixty opt-outs out of some 
30,000 potential claims.  Those were ultimately negotiated down to, I think, fewer 
than ten. 
And at last count, the settlement has been–it’s been successful, it’s been funded, 
and the class members are starting to get paid now.  And I think the model for the 
Sulzer settlement is one that can be used for other companies that are facing the same 
sort of predicament that Sulzer did. 
One of the things that militates against a settlement like this, I think, though, is 
the business model of the both plaintiff and the defense bar.  The defense bar, 
obviously, wants to prolong litigation, and it’s the way they defend cases.  They take 
depositions, they conduct hearings, and anything they can do to generally outbill.  
Quick resolution of the case is not the typical business model of the large defense 
firms.  So they’re generally antagonistic toward a quick resolution like this.   
The Plaintiffs’ Bar, on the other hand, doesn’t like to have a settlement crammed 
down like this was.  They like to–at least some think they can get there first and get 
their clients all the assets of the company.   
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But on balance, there needs to be some sort of a resolution, maybe even 
reinvigoration of 23(b)(1)(b), so a settlement like we were able to negotiate with 
Sulzer can come to pass, or at least be readily available for a company that’s willing 
to put its assets on the line, to make up for its own mistakes.   
Thank you very much for having me.  And I hope this has been a bit 
enlightening.  It’s been a great pleasure.  Thank you very much. 
MS. BECKER:  I would like to open it up for questions and a panel discussion, 
but since I have the microphone, I’m taking the prerogative of asking the first 
question.  And what I would like to ask is this:   
When you look at the history of this litigation, you compare it to other similar 
litigation, class actions, you see there’s a lot of potential here where things could 
have gone wrong.  So my question is:  What made this case work? 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  You know, I’ve thought about that a lot.  I mean 
there’s always, you know, one piece that you can say, well, that was great, that really 
was critical or this was critical, that was critical.   
I actually think that in this case one of the things that really made this case work 
goes all the way back to the very beginning.  And that is, David Wise, General 
Counsel of Sulzer, waking up and realizing that he can’t litigate these cases.  And 
that’s a realization that, while in hindsight a lot of people say, well, in many cases 
someone should realize sooner, he realized it early on.   
And it’s hard for companies.  I mean they had some defenses, they had causation 
defenses, they had other defenses.  He at some point said to himself, “This company 
is going to go out of business and all these people,” and you have to understand, this 
claimant class was particularly sympathetic, because think about who gets hip 
replacements.  We’re talking about usually an elderly class, or a class of people, if 
not elderly, had other physical problems to begin with.  They would have been a very 
sympathetic class of claimants.  And he said, we’re going to all end up losing.   
And I think a lot of it was the decision to get the Scruggs Law Firm involved and 
made the decision early on that there had to be another way.  So that piece, I think, 
was critical.  While I think there are a lot of other things along the road that stopped 
it from derailing, I think the mere fact that that realization occurred so early on was 
critical.   
AUDIENCE:  Generally why couldn’t the company just file bankruptcy to force 
the settlement and then get out of bankruptcy later and that would have caused the 
Plaintiffs to sort of have more incentive to settle quickly?   
MR. BACKSTROM:  In short, it would have ruined the business.  Sulzer 
wouldn’t have any credibility in the marketplace, and ultimately they would have 
had to shut the doors. 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  Remember that bankruptcy process is a much 
longer process.  I mean by the time you get all of the claimants, you wouldn’t have 
just your hip claimants, you would have every other possible claimant.  
AUDIENCE:  Couldn’t they just negotiate a class action settlement in 
bankruptcy and then get out of bankruptcy after that was funded? 
MR. BACKSTROM:  Yeah.  I mean, again, they could have gone that route, but 
they felt from a business standpoint that would have killed them.  Doctors would 
have moved on to other products, because doctors train on one type of product when 
they do these surgeries, and they don’t want to have to wonder if this company is 
going to be around in two, three years from now when they are going through an 
extensive training on a product.  Instead, they’re going to jump ship and go to the 
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next product.  So, because of that reality, bankruptcy was not an option for an 
orthopedic implant maker like Sulzer. 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  From the Claimants’ standpoint, many of the 
Plaintiffs might not have still been alive by the time they came out of the bankruptcy.  
AUDIENCE:  I’m wondering what the basis was of the insurance company, 
because of the strategies of the lien, which was genius, they thought possibly that 
that would exempt them from paying claims, or did you imply that, or was that not– 
MR. KENNEDY:  No.  The insurance company’s proceeds were subject to the 
lien.  The insurance company agreed up front to throw all their monies in and have it 
be subject to the lien.   
I talked about two different policies.  There was a $250 million policy that was 
not at issue whatsoever.  There was a second policy at $165 million, and there were 
various issues as to whether or not that was applicable to these cases.  So that was 
more of a coverage issue. 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  There’s a very important issue that I thought of 
when Dick Scruggs was talking that no one mentioned.  The insurance policy was a 
“wasting policy.”  So that the litigation costs were eating the policy up, which was 
another reason why the writ under the All Writs Act was arguably justified, because 
the primary asset that was available to pay off these claimants was disappearing. 
AUDIENCE:  How did they get FDA approval in the first place? 
MR. KENNEDY:  The problem with this product, we didn’t get into it in great 
detail, it was not a design problem.  It was that along the lines they changed the 
manufacturing process.  
And what ultimately occurred was–oil is used during the manufacturing process.  
When they changed the process, you’re allowed to have some small amount of oil on 
the exterior portion of the shell, but that amount of oil increased in amount.   
And in addition to that, there were an excessive amount of endotoxins on that 
shell also.  Endotoxins are skeletons of bacteria that’s been killed.  So they would 
sterilize it, leaving endotoxins behind.  And probably the rinse water was dirtier than 
it should have been, so there was excessive of amounts of endotoxins and excessive 
oil in certain batches.   
So it was not a design problem the FDA would have picked up.  It was a change 
in the manufacturing process they would not have picked up.  It took various batches 
and made them defective.  Made the tissue not grow into the exterior of the implant. 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  Most doctors would tell you this is probably one 
of the best hip implants on the market, and that but for the fact that it wasn’t cleaned 
properly, they would tomorrow put this in, if it wasn’t for this controversy.  That was 
part of it.   
This company made incredibly good products.  It just made a mistake in making 
this particular one.  
AUDIENCE:  With respect to the problems associated with the state court cases 
initially proceeding and the danger that posed for the federal court cases and the 
MDL, couldn’t Sulzer have sought removal of the state court cases and had them 
shipped along as tag-along cases under the statute? 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  Many of them were.  Many of the 300 cases that 
were in federal court had originally been in state court and they were removed.  The 
problem is that Sulzer Orthopedics was in Texas, so you could not remove many of 
the state court cases in Texas.   
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In California they sued all the doctors, so while Sulzer was arguing, Sulzer tried 
to remove and argued that the doctors had been improperly joined, in many cases 
they had some legitimate argument that the doctors knew about this sooner than the 
recall, and that the doctors might legitimately have been claimants.   
The doctors were released in our summary for that reason, but as many cases as 
could be removed, were removed.  And then there was an effort to remove a bunch 
of cases because of the All Writs Act, which the Supreme Court has recently said 
that that doesn’t work.  And, in fact, I didn’t like it very much when they tried to do 
it.   
But they did try to create removal jurisdiction under the All Writs Act later for 
some of the Texas cases, but I ended up sending them back.   
AUDIENCE:  I have two questions, actually.  That’s not cheating.  The first one 
is it’s my understanding that both Plaintiffs and the Defendants in the MDL wanted 
the writ; is that correct? 
MR. KENNEDY:  Yes.  
AUDIENCE:  So who appealed? 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  The state court lawyers.  The state court 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers.  
AUDIENCE:  And they have standing to appeal your decision because their 
clients are members of the class?  
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  Their cases were the ones being stayed.  
AUDIENCE:  I see.  The second one is to what extent, if any, was there 
coordination between the settlement counsel, for lack of a better term, and Defense 
counsel in the MDL and the Defense counsel in the state court cases, or were they 
the same people? 
MS. BECKER:  The question is:  Was there coordination among the Plaintiffs 
counsel in the state court actions, as well as in the coordination with the federal court 
attorneys.  
AUDIENCE:  That was the first question.  The second was the same question, 
only flip side.  Was there coordination between the Defense counsel in the state court 
cases and the Defense counsel in the MDL? 
MR. BACKSTROM:  From the defense side of things, there was a lot of 
coordination.  Sulzer had initially a firm in the west coast called Crosby Heafey, that 
was their national coordinating counsel.  And then during the process, Sulzer 
switched over to Shook, Hardy & Bacon.   
And I was in daily contact with both of those firms, when they were defending 
the cases.  Really, because we were trying to do certain things with the settlement.  
Every little thing that came up, like, for example, in Maryland these Plaintiff lawyers 
had garnished our bank accounts in Maryland, so that was a situation we had to deal 
with.   
Situations like that from local counsel level to national counsel to us because at 
all times during our involvement the company was teetering on the edge of 
bankruptcy and any one insignificant upset after the recall could have killed the 
company.  So there was an extreme amount of coordination on a daily basis with 
those firms. 
AUDIENCE:  My question is directed to the entire panel.  As each of you play a 
unique role in this litigation, what was the most singular problem each of you faced?  
MR. KENNEDY:  Staying afloat long enough to resolve the case and sell it to 
everybody in the country.  I mean it was just staying alive.  
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AUDIENCE:  Persistence.  
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  You know, I was going to joke and say, which 
day in terms of the problems.   
Part of our biggest problem, I mean think about it, I didn’t have a whole law firm.  
I had one law clerk working with me and my courtroom deputy trying to keep track 
of this.   
Probably our biggest problem was to make sure that we continued to send the 
message that we were in control.  That we understood there was a lot going on, there 
was a lot of negotiation back and forth, but that ultimately they weren’t going to do 
anything without me knowing it and without me approving of it.   
And in order to do that, we had to at least stay up with them and their 
movements, you know, preferably one step ahead.  So the pace that we had to keep 
while still running our other docket was pretty extreme.  I mean it left one law clerk 
to do the whole rest of the docket in many instances.   
So it was–I would say that attempting to stay in control and to–these guys all 
knew each other.  Think about it.  Well, Scruggs and Backstrom want to call 
themselves settlement counsel.  They sort of warped into defense counsel, but they 
don’t want to admit that, because they had to all work together.  But these guys knew 
each other, they knew who the players were.  They knew everything that was going 
on a nationwide basis, and we were playing catch-up in many instances. 
MR. BACKSTROM:  For us, the biggest challenge was one of our biggest 
assets that we brought to the table–our relationships with the Plaintiffs’ Bar.  We had 
worked and continue to work with a lot of these guys.   
And so that was good, because it gave us instant credibility and allowed us to cut 
through a lot of the posturing that often occurs in complex litigation settlements 
discussions.  But at the same time as we were negotiating the deals, people would 
come to us just ranting, people who had cases, and say, well, we can’t have this term 
because my client, who has got this issue.  
And so, you know, we would get, I mean, literally hundreds of calls a day from 
good friends of ours who had legitimate concerns.  And we just had to tell them in 
many instances, “We can’t help you.  You’ve got to go to class counsel.  You’ve got 
to run it through them, and then we’ll deal with it through them.”  But we can’t just 
continue to handle all these individual inquiries, because it frustrates the entire 
process. 
HONORABLE McMONAGLE:  I’m in a little unique position in that we can 
only pay out to valid claimants.  If we would ever pay one dollar out to a claimant 
who is not valid, that’s a dollar less that a valid claimant gets.   
Basically I’m in a situation while where people’s claims are pending, that I owe 
my fiduciary relationship to those people who are adverse to me.  And that’s sort of a 
funny situation to be in.  But it goes on on a daily basis.   
The other thing, as I said before, the biggest thing that we had to do is recognize 
the key to these things is when people read about a settlement of a class action or 
emergence of a bankruptcy or something like that, they think the money should be in 
the mail the next day.   
In order to make these things successful, to pay out, the money should be in the 
mail as soon as you can get to it and as soon as the next day as possible.  
AUDIENCE:  I was wondering what your thoughts were on the–before Congress 
right now, the House and Senate, the idea that these cases should be folded, and most 
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should go to the federal court system.  Would that alleviate some of the problems 
you faced in this case, and do you just generally think it’s a good idea? 
MR. KENNEDY:  It certainly would take away from the need to issue an All 
Writs Act.  I mean if they were all federalized, they would all be pushed to the MDL 
Panel, all would have been consolidated in front of Judge O’Malley, so we wouldn’t 
have had that issue. 
I mean it’s a tremendous issue, you know, between constitutional state rights 
versus the federal system. 
The other side of it, on the Plaintiffs’ side of it, if you want, from one aspect it 
made things difficult, because you needed to use the All Writs Act to stop the state 
court litigation.   
There’s a whole lot of lawyers who believe this whole thing worked and 
happened because we did have a state court system where litigants were able to 
move fast in their home courts and put pressure on Sulzer. 
So it certainly alleviated one situation, that being a control issue.  And the 
absolute inevitable, frankly, all of these issues have a state versus federal problem.  
There’s a whole lot of lawyers in this country.  Sid and I agree from the defense side, 
one of the real driving factors was the fact that you had a hoard of people out in the 
state court system driving towards trial dates.   
I think most of them, particularly significant cases, until you have the threat of a 
trial case or the threshold of a trial case, you don’t settle cases.  So it would solve 
some problems.  It would create others. 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  There clearly needs to be some fixes with respect 
to both the MDL system and the authority of federal courts to address cases like this.  
The problem is that in this case, for instance, removing the state court class actions 
into the federal system wouldn’t have really changed much, because it was the 
individual cases, the people with three and four surgeries, because some of them had 
the hip implants and then they put another bad one put in when they realized the first 
one didn’t work.  Before the recall, the surgeons put second bad ones in and they had 
them on both sides.  So it was these clearly injured parties that had those individual 
cases that were really driving the threat of bankruptcy.   
So I don’t know that saying that as soon as you call something a class action it 
goes into federal court would change this kind of dynamic.  And I’m not sure 
whether it would change much.   
The state court lawyers really don’t like class actions, you know, the ones–the 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers, like Dick Scruggs, generally don’t like class actions.  
AUDIENCE:  What about further clogging the federal courts?  
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  You always hear about that.  I’ve got to tell you, 
the federal courts are doing pretty well right now.  Our dockets are pretty under 
control.  The dockets, especially in this district, are particularly good.  But I think in 
most districts in the federal court system we’re a lot better off than the state court 
judges.  We can move things probably more efficiently than a lot of the state court 
systems. 
AUDIENCE:  I wonder if you could talk to the viability of the model of the first 
settlement.  That is, with the liens, whether that would work in another case. 
MR. KENNEDY:  Well, the opponents of the lien basically said that they have a 
Constitutional right to a jury trial, and that if you put liens in effect, which basically 
said go get a jury verdict, but you can’t collect for seven years, they maintain that 
that was a denial of the right to a jury trial. 
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Professor Miller maintains that the Constitution guaranties you the right to a jury 
trial, but it doesn’t guarantee you the right to win your jury trial, and it certainly 
doesn’t guarantee the right to collect on a jury verdict. 
So I think you’ve got–and, frankly, I didn’t see the case law stating that on either 
side, but a lot of people use the Telectronics decision to say it really says this, it 
really says that.  I’m not sure Telectronics in this case really speaks to the issue.   
So I think that you’ll see it attempted again, but it creates a whole lot of big 
policy issues and problems.  I’m not sure–legally, I kind of buy the argument to the 
Constitution only guaranties you a right to a trial, not to win and not to collect.  But 
you could– 
HONORABLE O’MALLEY:  I thought the mechanism was fairly ingenious.  
While it’s true, as Eric said, that it caused an outcry, it also caused a lot of people to 
come to the table to discuss that outcry.   
And so in some ways, it forced everybody into the same room, if for no other 
reason than to complain.  At that point, that’s where you begin to start the dialogue.  
I actually think, for the reasons that I said, that it’s not unconstitutional, and that it 
can be workable. 
And perhaps it’s a question of how long the delay would be, but I thought it–I 
thought it was extremely clever on the part of the Sulzer Defendant. 
MR. BACKSTROM:  You know, in looking at the way that deal was structured, 
it had to be that way, because the company was going to pay off that settlement over 
six years.  Well, if they’re getting rung up for judgments along the way, you’ll 
quickly go bankrupt and then a payout settlement agreement isn’t worth the paper 
it’s written on.  So it kind of had to be that way.  For the deal class counsel initially 
negotiated, having liens in place was the only way to make sure the class was 
protected against future judgments.  And I think it has to be viable as a result.  We 
may try it again.  
MS. BECKER:  My final question, because we’re almost out of time, is whether 
the panelists know what happened to the opt-outs, because I think there would be a 
potential, even if there’s less than ten, you get several multi-million dollar verdicts, 
that might damage the viability of the company. 
MR. KENNEDY:  Sid? 
MR. BACKSTROM:  We’ve got, I think, one revised opt-out that still rattles 
around out there.  There’s no trial date in that case.  We’ve got some unrevised opt-
outs with no trial date on the horizon.  We’re just going to have to deal with it.   
Our position has always been, if we have to try them, we’ll just go in and do the 
best we can under the circumstances and hope that we get a reasonable verdict.  
MS. BECKER:  You will be Defense Counsel in those cases?  
MR. BACKSTROM:  No.  But we will continue in our role as special counsel if 
the Company wishes. 
MS. BECKER:  On that note, I would like to thank our panelists, Mr. Kennedy, 
Judge O’Malley, Sidney Backstrom, Judge McMonagle.   
